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Abstract
The problem of adversarial samples has been studied extensively for neural net-
works. However, for boosting, in particular boosted decision trees and decision
stumps there are almost no results, even though boosted decision trees, as e.g.
XGBoost, are quite popular due to their interpretability and good prediction perfor-
mance. We show in this paper that for boosted decision stumps the exact min-max
optimal robust loss and test error for an l∞-attack can be computed inO(nT log T ),
where T is the number of decision stumps and n the number of data points, as well
as an optimal update of the ensemble in O(n2T log T ). While not exact, we show
how to optimize an upper bound on the robust loss for boosted trees. Up to our
knowledge these are the first algorithms directly optimizing provable robustness
guarantees in the area of boosting. We make the code of all our experiments publicly
available at http://github.com/max-andr/provably-robust-boosting.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks achieve excellent performance on complex prediction tasks in computer
vision or natural language processing. However, it has recently been shown that they are easily
fooled by imperceptible perturbations [34, 15] or tend to output high-confidence predictions on
out-of-distribution inputs [28, 27, 18] that have nothing to do with the original classes. Moreover
[18] suggest that the latter behavior cannot be prevented unless one changes the neural network
architecture. One of the most popular defenses against adversarial examples for neural networks
is adversarial training [15, 25]. It has been formulated within a principled framework of robust
optimization [31, 25], however the inner maximization problem is difficult as the underlying problem
is non-convex for neural networks. A large variety of suggested sophisticated defenses [19, 5, 23]
could be broken again via more sophisticated attacks [1, 12, 26]. Moreover, empirical robustness
can also arise from gradient masking or obfuscation [1] and thus one can never be sure if more
powerful attacks can break a given heuristic defense. A solution of this problem are methods which
lead to neural networks with provable robustness guarantees [17, 42, 30, 47, 45, 10, 16, 9] or lead
to networks which can be certified e.g. via the mixed-integer programming formulation of [35].
However, this certification process does not scale at the moment to large networks and networks
having provable robustness guarantees are lacking in terms of prediction performance compared to
standard ones.
While the adversarial problem has been studied extensively for neural networks, other classifier
models have received much less attention e.g. kernel machines [46, 29, 17, 3], k-nearest neighbors
[40], and decision trees [29, 7, 3]. Boosting, in particular boosted decision trees, is quite popular,
e.g. XGBoost [8], due to its interpretability and competitive prediction performance. While robust
boosting has been considered [41, 24, 13] it refers in their context to a large functional margin or
robustness with respect to outliers e.g. via using a robust loss function, but not to the adversarial
robustness we are considering in this paper.
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Figure 1: Left: boosted decision stumps: normal and our robust. Right: boosted decision trees: normal and our
robust. For both types of weak learners, the normal models have very small geometric margin, while our robust
models also classify all training points correctly but additionally enforce a large geometric margin.
In this paper, we show how to exactly compute the robust loss and test error for an ensemble of decision
stumps with coordinate-aligned splits and robustness with respect to the l∞-norm. Even better we
show that one can solve the update problem of the ensemble of decision stumps globally optimal and
thus one can directly minimize the robust min-max loss without any approximation. The difference
of the resulting robust boosted decision stumps compared to normal boosted stumps is visualized in
Figure 1. Very recently, [7] considered the robust min-max loss for an ensemble of decision trees with
coordinate-aligned splits. They propose an approximation of the inner maximization problem but
without any guarantees. The robustness guarantees are obtained via certification with [20], which have
proposed a mixed-integer-programming formulation for the computation of the minimal adversarial
perturbation for tree ensembles. However, their approach does not scale to large problems. While the
approach of [7] leads to tree ensembles with improved empirical and certified robustness, they have
no approximation guarantee on the robust loss or robust error during training time. In contrast we
show how to derive an upper bound on the robust loss for tree ensembles based on our results for an
ensemble of decision stumps and we show how that upper bound can be minimized during training.
Our derived upper bound is quite tight and leads directly to provable guarantees on the robustness of
decision splits. Moreover, we obtain tight guarantees for the resulting tree ensemble when the tree
construction is combined with a pruning scheme that ensures minimization of the upper bound on the
robust loss for the whole ensemble.
2 Boosting and Robust Optimization for Adversarial Robustness
In this section we fix the notation and the framework of boosting we want to tackle and define briefly
the basis of robust optimization for adversarial robustness, underlying adversarial training. In the next
section we derive the specific robust training procedure for an ensemble of decision stumps where we
optimize the exact robust loss and for a tree ensemble where we optimize an upper bound.
Boosting While the main ideas can be generalized to the multi-class setting, for simplicity of the
derivations we restrict ourselves to the binary classification case, that is our labels y are in {−1, 1}
and we assume to have d real-valued features. Boosting can be described as the task of fitting an
ensemble F : Rd → R of weak learners ft : Rd → R given as
F (x) =
T∑
t=1
ft(x).
The final classification is done via the sign of F (x). In boosting the ensemble is fitted in a greedy
way in the sense that given the already estimated ensemble we determine an update F ′ = F + fT+1,
by fitting the new weak learner fT+1 being guided by the performance of the current ensemble F .
In this paper we focus on the exponential loss L : R → R, where we use the functional margin
formulation where for a point (x, y) ∈ Rd × {−1, 1} it is defined as L(y f(x)) = exp(−y f(x)).
However, all the following algorithms can be generalized to any strictly monotonically decreasing,
convex loss function L, e.g. logistic loss L(y f(x)) = ln(1 + exp(−yf(x))). The advantage of the
exponential loss is that it decouples F and the update fT+1 in the estimation process and allows to
see the estimation process for fT+1 as fitting a weighted exponential loss where the weights to fit
(x, y) are given by exp(−y F (x)),
L(y F ′(x)) = exp
(− y (F (x) + fT+1(x))) = exp (− y F (x)) exp (− y fT+1(x)).
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In this paper we consider as weak learners: a) decision stumps of the form ft : Rd → R, ft(x) =
wl + wr1xi≥b, where one does a coordinate-aligned split and b) decision trees (binary tree) of the
form ft(x) = u
(t)
qt(x)
, where u(t)qt(x) : F → R is a mapping from the set of leaves F of the tree to R
with |F | = Nt and qt : Rd → F is a mapping which assigns to every input the leaf of the tree it ends
up. While the approach can be generalized to general linear splits of the form, wl + wr1〈v,x〉≥b, we
concentrate on coordinate-aligned splits, wl +wr1xi≥b which are easier to interpret for humans. The
trees are first grown to maximum depth and post-hoc one recursively prunes all the leaf splits with
negative gain.
Robust optimization for Adversarial Robustness The problem of adversarial perturbations is
known in spam classification and has been rediscovered in [34]. It can be formulated as finding the
minimal perturbation with respect to some metric such that the classifier decision is wrong1
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p (1)
yif(xi + δ) ≤ 0, xi + δ ∈ C
where (xi, yi) ∈ Rd × {−1, 1} and C is a constraint set the data has to fulfill. We denote by δ∗p,i the
optimal solution of this problem for (xi, yi). Furthermore, let ∆p() := {δ ∈ R | ‖δ‖p ≤ } be the set
of perturbations with respect to which we want to be robust (attack model). Then the robust test error
with respect to ∆p() is defined for a test set (xi, yi)ni=1 as the fractionRTEp() :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 1δ
∗
p,i≤.
The optimization problem (1) is non-convex for neural networks and can only be solved exactly via
mixed-integer programming [35] which does not scale, especially during training. Thus lower bounds
on the robust test error are obtained via heuristic attacks [25, 6] whereas provable robustness aims at
providing upper bounds on the robust test error and the optimization of these bounds during training
[17, 42, 30, 47, 45, 10, 16, 9]. For an ensemble of trees the optimization problem (1) can also be
reformulated as a mixed-integer-program [20] which does not scale to large datasets.
The goal of improving adversarial robustness can be formulated as a robust optimization problem
with respect to the set of allowed perturbations ∆p() [31, 25].
min
θ
n∑
i=1
max
δ∈∆p()
L(f(xi + δ; θ), yi) (2)
For neural networks the corresponding training process is called adversarial training [15], where
one tries at each update step to approximately solve the inner maximization problem which again is
non-convex and thus globally optimal solutions are very difficult to obtain. Our goal in the following
are provable robustness guarantees for boosted stumps and trees which are optimized during training,
which we show how to do in the following two sections.
3 Exact Robust Loss Optimization for Boosted Decision Stumps
We first show how the exact robust loss
∑n
i=1 maxδ∈∆p() L(yi F (xi + δ; θ)) can be computed for
an ensemble F of decision stumps. While decision stumps are very simple weak learners, they have
been used in original AdaBoost [14] and were successfully employed in object detection [38] or face
detection [39] which could be done in real-time due to the simplicity of the classifier.
3.1 Exact Robust Test Error for Boosted Decision Stumps
The ensemble of decision stumps can be written as
F (x) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xct) =
T∑
t=1
(
w
(t)
l + w
(t)
r 1xct≥bt
)
, (3)
where ct is the coordinate for which ft makes a split. First, observe that a point x ∈ R with label y
is correctly classified when yF (x) > 0. In order to determine whether the point x is adversarially
1Note that there are variants where one requires to change the decision of the classifier instead but we stick
to the formulation related to the robust test error.
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robust wrt L∞-perturbations, one have to solve the following optimization problem:
G(x, y) := min
‖δ‖∞≤
yF (x+ δ) (4)
If G(x, y) ≤ 0, then the point x is non-robust. If G(x, y) > 0, then the point x is robust, i.e. it is
not possible to change the class. Thus the exact minimization of (4) over the test set yields the exact
robust test error. For many state-of-the-art classifiers, this problem is NP-hard. For particular MIP
formulations for tree ensembles see [20] or for neural networks see [35]. Closed-form solutions are
known for linear classifiers [15].
We can solve this certification problem for the robust test error exactly and efficiently by noting
that the objective is separable wrt the input dimensions, and then solving up to d one-dimensional
optimization problems as also our attack model ∆∞() is separable. We denote by Sk = {s ∈
{1, . . . , T} | cs = k}, i.e. the set of stump indices that split coordinate k. Then
min
‖δ‖∞≤
yF (x+ δ) = min
‖δ‖∞≤
T∑
t=1
yft(xct + δct) = min‖δ‖∞≤
d∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
yfs(xk + δk) (5)
=
d∑
k=1
min
|δk|≤
∑
s∈Sk
yfs(xk + δk) =
d∑
k=1
[ ∑
s∈Sk
yw
(s)
l + min|δk|≤
∑
s∈Sk
yw(s)r 1xk+δk≥bs
]
:=
d∑
k=1
Gk(x, y)
The one-dimensional optimization problem min
|δk|≤
∑
s∈Sk yw
(s)
r 1xk+δk≥bs can be solved by simply
checking all |Sk|+ 1 piece-wise constant regions of the classifier for δ ∈ [−, ]. The overall time
complexity of the exact certification is O(T log T ) since we need to sort all thresholds bs (up to T of
them) in ascending order to efficiently calculate the partial sums depending on thresholds.
Moreover, using this result, we can obtain provably minimal adversarial examples. By noting that
the function F (x + δ) is piece-wise constant with T + 1 constant regions, it suffices to solve this
minimization problem for every  ∈ {0} ∪ {|bt − xct |+ ν sign(bt − xct) | t = 1, . . . , T} (where ν
is as small as precision allows) sorted in ascending order and stop when  is large enough to change
the original class. In order to get the final perturbation vector δ, we have to save the indices δ∗j that
minimize yF (x + δ) for every splitting coordinate j which are used in the ensemble. We provide
visualizations of adversarial examples in the experimental section.
Finally, as we assume that L is monotonically decreasing it holds:
max
δ∈∆∞()
L(yi F (xi + δ)) = L
(
min
δ∈∆∞()
yiF (xi + δ)
)
,
and thus the above algorithm can directly be used to compute also the robust loss.
3.2 Exact Robust Optimization for Boosted Decision Stumps
For updating the ensemble F with a new stump f splitting coordinate j, we first have to solve the
inner maximization problem over ∆∞() in (2) before2 we optimize the parameters wl, wr, b of f :
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L
(
yiF (xi + δ) + yif(xij + δj)
)
= L
(
min
‖δ‖∞≤
[ d∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
yifs(xik + δk) + yif(xij + δj)
])
= L
(∑
k 6=j
min
|δk|≤
∑
s∈Sk
yifs(xik + δk) + min|δj |≤
[ ∑
s∈Sj
yifs(xij + δj) + yif(xij + δj)
])
= L
(∑
k 6=j
Gk(xi, yi) +
∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
l + yiwl + min|δj |≤
[ ∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
r 1xij+δj≥bs + yiwr1xij+δj≥b
])
.
In order to solve the remaining optimization problem for δj we have to make a case distinction
based on the values of wr. However, first we define the minimal values of the ensemble part on
δj ∈ [−, b− xij) and δj ∈ [b− xij , ] as
hl(xij , yi) := min
δj<b−xij
|δj |≤
∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
r 1xij+δj≥bs , hr(xij , yi) := min
δj≥b−xij
|δj |≤
∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
r 1xij+δj≥bs
2The order is very important as a min-max problem is not the same as a max-min problem.
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These problems can be solved analogously to Gk(x, y). Then we get the case distinction:
g(xij , yi;wr) = min|δj |≤
[ ∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
r 1xij+δj≥bs + yiwr1xij+δj≥b
]
(6)
=
{
hr(xij , yi) + yiwr if b− xij ≤ − or (|b− xij | ≤  and hl(xij , yi) > hr(xij , yi) + yiwr)
hl(xij , yi) if b− xij >  or (|b− xij | ≤  and hl(xij , yi) ≤ hr(xij , yi) + yiwr)
Note that g(xij , yi;wr) as a function of wr is concave. The following Lemma shows that the full
loss is jointly convex in wl, wr.
Lemma 3.1 Let g : R→ R be concave and L : R→ R convex and monotonically decreasing. Then
L˜ : R2 → R defined as L˜(x, y) = L(c+ d x+ g(y)) is convex for any c, d ∈ R.
Proof. Let z1 = (x1, y1) and z2 = (x2, y2) be in R2. Then for λ ∈ (0, 1),
L˜(λz1 + (1− λ)z2) = L
(
c+ d (λx1 + (1− λ)x2) + g(λy1 + (1− λ)y2)
)
≤ L(c+ d (λx1 + (1− λ)x2) + λ1g(y1) + (1− λ)g(y2))
= L
(
λ(c+ d x1 + g(y1)) + (1− λ)(c+ d x2 + g(y2))
)
≤ λL(c+ d x1 + g(y1))+ (1− λ)L(c+ d x2 + g(y2)))
= λL˜(z1) + (1− λ)L˜(z2).

Thus the loss term for each data point is jointly convex in wl, wr and consequently the sum of
the losses is convex as well. This means that for the overall robust optimization problem over the
parameters wl, wr (for fixed b) we have to minimize the piecewise defined convex function with up
to n+ 1 case distinctions on wr:
L∗(j, b) = min
m∈{0,...,n}
min
wr∈[ppim ,ppim+1 ),
wl
n∑
i=1
L
(∑
k 6=j
Gk(xi, yi) +
∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
l + yiwl + g(xij , yi;wr)
)
where the vector ppi is obtained by sorting the values pk = hl(xkj , yk)− hr(xkj , yk) augmenting the
first and last elements p0 and pn+1 with −∞ and∞ respectively in ascending order pi. There is no
closed-form minimizer wrt wr even when wl is fixed. Thus we apply coordinate descent to minimize
the loss where the minimum wrt wr is found via bisection, and wrt wl via a closed-form minimizer
when wr is fixed. Concretely, if we denote 1i to be equal to 1 if the first condition of (6) is true, and
0 otherwise, and also
γi = exp
(−∑
k 6=j
Gk(xi, yi)−
∑
s∈Sj
yiw
(s)
l − hr(xij , yi)1i − hl(xij , yi)(1− 1i)
)
,
then the total exponential loss is L(wl, wr) =
∑n
i=1 γi exp
(− yiwl − yiwr1i). We further denote
1yi=y =
{
1 if yi = y
0 if yi 6= y and
Σ1,1 =
n∑
i=1
1i1yi=1γi Σ1,−1 =
n∑
i=1
1i1yi=−1γi (7)
Σ0,1 =
n∑
i=1
(1− 1i)1yi=1γi Σ0,−1 =
n∑
i=1
(1− 1i)1yi=−1γi
Then the coordinate descent update for wl can be derived by setting ∂L∂wl to zero:
wl :=
1
2
ln
(
exp(−wr)Σ1,1 + Σ0,1
)− 1
2
ln
(
exp(wr)Σ1,−1 + Σ0,−1
)
We note that this does not create a significant overhead, since we perform only operations on scalars
Σ1,1, Σ1,−1, Σ0,1, Σ0,−1. The overall complexity for a particular coordinate j and fixed threshold b is
O(n) in the number of training examples times the effort for coordinate descent which is logarithmic
in the desired precision (cost for bisection).
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Finally, we have to minimize over all possible thresholds. We choose the potential thresholds
b ∈ Bj = {xij − − ν, xij + + ν | i = 1, . . . , n}, were ν can be as small as precision allows and
is just introduced so that the thresholds lie outside of ∆∞(). We optimize the robust loss L∗(j, b)
for all thresholds b ∈ Bj and determine the minimum. For each contiguous set of minimizers we
determine the nearest neighbors in Bj and check the thresholds half-way to them (note that they
have at most the same robust loss but never a better one) and then take the threshold in the middle of
all the ones having equal loss. As there are in the worst case 2n thresholds, the overall complexity
of one update step is O(n2T log T ). And finally, at each update step one typically selects a small
random subset of the coordinates and takes the one which yields the smallest overall robust loss of
the ensemble.
4 Optimization of an Upper Bound on the Robust Loss for a Tree Ensemble
Similarly to decision stumps we first provide an upper bound on the robust test error which is then
used further on in the update step of tree ensemble by minimizing an upper bound on the robust loss.
4.1 Upper bound and exact computation of the robust test error for a tree ensemble
Our goal is to solve the optimization problem (4). While the exact minimization is NP-hard for trees
[20], we will similarly to [43, 30] for neural networks derive a tractable lower bound G˜(x, y) on
G(x, y) for an ensemble of trees.
min
‖δ‖p≤
yF (x+ δ) = min
‖δ‖p≤
T∑
t=1
yu
(t)
qt(x+δ)
≥
T∑
t=1
min
‖δ‖p≤
yu
(t)
qt(x+δ)
:= G˜(x, y) (8)
If G˜(x, y) ≥ 0, then the point x is provably robust. However, if G˜(x, y) < 0, the point may be either
robust or non-robust. In this way, we get an upper bound on the number of non-robust points, which
yields an upper bound on the robust test error. We note that for a decision tree, min‖δ‖p≤ yu
(t)
qt(x+δ)
can be found exactly by checking all leafs which are reachable for points in Bp(x, ). The complexity
is O(2D) where D is the depth of the tree, but this remains tractable for shallow trees in the ensemble,
e.g. up to 8 as used in [7] for efficient training.
4.2 Minimization of an upper bound on the robust loss for tree ensembles
The goal is to bound the inner maximization problem of Equation (2) based on the certificate that
we derived. Note that we aim to bound the loss of the whole ensemble F + f , and thus we do not
use approximations of the loss, and we also do not use the approximate split suggested in [8]. We
use p = ∞, that is the attack model is ∆∞(). Let F (x) =
∑T
t=1 ft(x) =
∑T
t=1 u
(t)
qt(x)
be a fixed
ensemble of trees and f a new tree with which we update the ensemble.
min
f
n∑
i=1
max
‖δ‖p≤
L
(
yi
(
F (xi + δ) + f(xi + δ)
))
(9)
The inner maximization problem can be upper bounded for every tree separately given that L(yf(x))
is monotonically decreasing wrt yf(x), and using our certificate for the ensemble of T + 1 trees:
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L
(
yiF (xi + δ) + yif(xi + δ)
)
= L
(
min
‖δ‖∞≤
[ T∑
t=1
yift(xi + δ) + yif(xi + δ)
])
≤ L
( T∑
t=1
min
‖δ‖∞≤
yift(xi + δ) + min‖δ‖∞≤
yif(xi + δ)
)
= L
(
G˜(xi, yi) + min‖δ‖∞≤
yif(xi + δ)
)
We can efficiently calculate G˜(xi, yi) as described in the previous subsection. But note that
min
‖δ‖∞≤
yif(xi + δ) depends on the tree f . The exact tree fitting is known to be NP-complete
[21], although it is still possible to scale it to some moderate-sized problems with recent advances in
MIP-solvers and hardware as shown in [2]. We want to keep the overall procedure scalable to large
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datasets, so we will stick to the standard greedy recursive algorithm for fitting the tree. On every step
of this process, we fit for some coordinate j ∈ {1, . . . , d} and for some splitting threshold b, a single
decision stump f(x) = wl + wr1xj≥b. Therefore, for a particular decision stump with threshold b
and coordinate j we have to solve the following problem:
min
wl,wr∈R
∑
i∈I
L
(
G˜(xi, yi) + yiwl + min|δj |≤
[
yiwr1xij+δj≥b
])
(10)
where I are all the points xi + δ which can reach this leaf for some δ with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ .
Finally, we have to make a case distinction depending on the values of wr and b− xij :
min
|δj |≤
yiwr1xij+δj≥b = yiwr ·
{
1 if b− xij < − or (|b− xij | ≤  and yiwr < 0)
0 if b− xij >  or (|b− xij | ≤  and yiwr ≥ 0) (11)
where we denote the case distinction for brevity as 1(xi, yi;wr). Note that the right side of (11) is
concave as a function of wr. Thus the overall robust optimization amounts to finding the minimum of
the following objective, which is again by Lemma 3.1 jointly convex in wl, wr:
L∗(j, b) = min
{
min
wr≥0,wl
∑
i:i∈I
L
(
G˜(xi, yi) + yiwl + yiwr1(xi, yi;wr)
)
, (12)
min
wr<0,wl
∑
i:i∈I
L
(
G˜(xi, yi) + yiwl + yiwr1(xi, yi;wr)
}
Since we have only two intervals w ≥ 0 and w < 0, we first find the minimum loss on each interval
separately via coordinate descent. By using the notation from (7), where now 1i := 1(xi, yi;wr),
the minimizers of wr and wl are given by setting ∂L∂wr and
∂L
∂wl
to zero:
wr :=
1
2
ln(Σ1,1)− 1
2
ln(Σ1,−1)− wl
wl :=
1
2
ln
(
exp(−wr)Σ1,1 + Σ0,1
)− 1
2
ln
(
exp(wr)Σ1,−1 + Σ0,−1
)
We iterate these updates of wr and wl until convergence. After finding the minimum of the objective
on a particular interval, we then combine the results from both intervals by taking the smallest loss
out of them.
Then we also consider the threshold selection as described in Section 3.2. Finally, as in other
tree building methods such as [4, 8], we perform pruning after a tree is constructed based on the
training robust loss (12) to ensure that it decreases at every iteration of tree boosting. This cannot be
guaranteed with robust splits alone since the tree construction process is greedy, and splits at one
branch of the tree may influence another. We note that in the extreme case, pruning may leave only a
robust stump at the root, for which we are guaranteed to decrease the robust loss. Thus every new
tree is guaranteed to reduce the training robust loss, and in practice pruning that leads to just a single
decision stump happens extremely rarely. We note that the total worst case complexity is O(n2) in
the number of training examples compared to O(n log n) for XGBoost, which is a relatively low
price given that the overall optimization problem is significantly more complicated than the original
XGBoost formulation.
5 Experiments
General setup: We are primarily interested in two quantities: test error (TE) and robust test error
(RTE) wrt l∞-perturbations. For boosted stumps, we can compute RTE exactly as described in
Section 3.1, but we also report the upper bound (URTE) to illustrate that it is actually tight for almost
all models. For boosted trees, we cannot compute RTE efficiently, thus we report the upper bound
(URTE) together with a lower bound (LRTE) given by solving the left-hand side of (8) by sampling
(250 trials). We observe that such a simple lower bound is actually tight enough for low-dimensional
datasets such as breast-cancer, diabetes or cod-rna, and also reasonably tight for MNIST, FMNIST
and GTS. Thus this is a reasonable quantity to assess the tightness of URTE obtained via (8). For
evaluation we use 7 datasets: breast-cancer [11], diabetes [32], cod-rna [37], MNIST 1-5 (digit 1 vs
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Table 1: Evaluation of robustness for boosted stumps. We show, in percentage, test error (TE), exact robust test
error (RTE), and upper bound on robust test error (URTE). Both variants of robust boosted stumps significantly
improve RTE on all datasets. We also observe that URTE is very close to RTE or even the same for many models.
Plain stumps Robust stumps Exact robust stumps
Dataset l∞  TE RTE URTE TE RTE URTE TE RTE URTE
breast-cancer 0.3 1.5 99.3 99.3 5.1 11.7 11.7 5.1 11.7 11.7
diabetes 0.05 28.6 77.9 77.9 27.9 32.5 32.5 29.2 32.5 32.5
cod-rna 0.025 4.8 37.4 38.5 12.0 22.4 22.4 12.0 22.4 22.4
MNIST 1-5 0.3 0.4 98.6 98.7 0.4 3.2 3.2 0.5 3.7 4.3
MNIST 2-6 0.3 1.8 100 100 2.6 8.6 8.6 2.6 8.9 8.9
FMNIST shoes 0.1 2.4 100 100 5.9 13.1 13.1 5.3 13.1 13.8
GTS 100-rw 8/255 1.5 30.0 30.0 3.5 14.3 14.3 3.7 12.4 12.4
GTS 30-70 8/255 14.4 76.7 76.7 18.1 32.8 32.8 17.0 32.7 32.7
Table 2: Evaluation of robustness for boosted trees. We show, in percentage, test error (TE), lower bound on
robust test error (LRTE) and upper bound on robust test error (URTE). The robust boosted trees significantly
improve RTE. We also observe that URTE is very close to LRTE or even the same in some cases which allows to
assess exact RTE.
Plain trees Robust trees
Dataset l∞  TE LRTE URTE TE LRTE URTE
breast-cancer 0.3 2.2 90.5 99.3 2.9 10.2 10.2
diabetes 0.05 27.3 52.6 53.2 28.6 33.1 33.1
cod-rna 0.025 4.2 39.1 64.1 8.3 22.8 23.2
MNIST 1-5 0.3 0.3 57.5 87.5 0.3 1.5 2.0
MNIST 2-6 0.3 1.2 98.1 100 0.7 3.5 5.0
FMNIST shoes 0.1 2.8 72.2 100.0 4.7 9.4 10.5
GTS 100-rw 8/255 2.5 12.3 21.1 4.7 9.2 10.1
GTS 30-70 8/255 14.2 38.8 63.9 14.9 25.6 27.2
digit 5) [22], MNIST 2-6 (digit 2 vs digit 6, following [20, 7]), FMNIST shoes (sandals vs sneakers)
[44], GTS 100-rw (speed 100 vs roadworks sign), and GTS 30-70 (speed 30 vs speed 70) [33].
We consider three boosted stumps models: plain model, robust stumps where each stump is bounded
independently as described in Section 4.2, and exact robust stumps as in Section 3.2. We consider two
boosted trees models: plain model, and as described in Section 4.2. We perform model selection based
on the validation set of 20% randomly selected points from the original training set, and we train on
the rest of the training set. We do up to 500 iterations of stumps and up to 50 iterations of trees, and
then select the final model based on the best validation test error for plain models, and based on the
best validation robust test error for robustly trained models. For boosted stumps, we optimize over up
to 10 coordinates for every split. For boosted trees, we grow trees up to depth 4, for every split we
optimize over up to 100 coordinates, we split a node if it contains at least 10 examples. All models are
trained with the exponential loss or with its robust version. More details about the experimental details
are available at our repository http://github.com/max-andr/provably-robust-boosting.
Boosted decision stumps: The results for boosted stumps are given in Table 1. We observe
that plain models are not robust within the considered perturbations. However, both variants of
robust boosted stumps that we propose significantly improve RTE on all datasets, which shows the
effectiveness of our method. The most extreme improvements compared to plain models are obtained
on breast-cancer dataset from 99.3% RTE to 11.7% and on MNIST 2-6 from 100% to 8.6% RTE.
We also notice that robust models perform slightly worse in terms of test error, which goes in line
with the empirical observation made for adversarial training for neural networks [25, 36]. Although
RTE is the exact quantity and is sufficient to judge about robustness of the considered models, we
still report URTE to show that it is very close to RTE. Remarkably, when URTE is integrated into
training, i.e. for robust stumps, it is equal to RTE for all models. This suggests that bounding the sum
over weak learners element-wise, as done in (8), might be tight enough to lead to robust models also
for tree ensembles, which we discuss next.
8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
value of the splitting threshold
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
nu
m
be
r o
f s
tu
m
ps
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MNIST 2-6: exact robust stumps
Figure 2: The distribution of the splitting thresholds for boosted stumps models trained on MNIST 2-6. We
can observe that both robust models are almost identical and always select splits in the range between 0.3 and
0.7, which is reasonable according to l∞-perturbations within  = 0.3. At the same time, the plain model splits
arbitrarily close to 0 or 1, which suggests that its decisions might be easily flipped by the adversary.
For boosted stumps or trees, unlike for neural networks, we can directly inspect the model and
the classification rules it learned. In particular, in Figure 2, we plot the distibution of the splitting
thresholds b for the three boosted stumps models on MNIST 2-6 reported in Table 1. We can observe
that both robust models always select splits in the range between 0.3 and 0.7, which is reasonable
given that more than 80% pixels of MNIST are either 0 or 1, and the considered l∞-perturbations are
within  = 0.3. At the same time, the plain model splits arbitrarily close to 0 or 1, which suggests
that its decisions might be easily flipped if the adversary is allowed to change them within . We
also note that robust stumps and exact robust stumps lead to almost identical histograms of splitting
thresholds, which again suggests that bounding every stump independently has a similar effect to
solving the corresponding minimization problem exactly.
Boosted decision trees: The results for boosted trees are given in Table 2. Note that now we
cannot compute efficiently RTE, so we rely on LRTE and URTE to judge about robustness. Similarly
to boosted stumps, we observe that robust training for boosted trees is also efficient in improving
robustness of the models. We make this conclusion since for every model URTE of robust trees is
lower than the LRTE of the corresponding plain models, often with a large margin. For example,
on MNIST 2-6, LRTE of the plain model is 98.1%, while URTE of the robust model is 5.0%. We
observe that URTE is very close to LRTE or even the same in some cases which allows to assess
exact RTE. We also note that while robust trees are often slightly worse than their plain counterparts
in terms of test error, they outperform the robust stumps models. Moreover, URTE of robust trees
is in many cases better than exact RTE of both versions robust stumps. This suggests that there is
a benefit of using more expressive weak learners in boosting such as trees to get more robust and
accurate models.
Exact adversarial examples for boosted stumps: In Section 3.1, we described how we can
efficiently obtain provably minimal (exact) adversarial examples for boosted stumps. We show them
for MNIST 1-5 and MNIST 2-6 datasets in Figure 3. We show the size of l∞-perturbation needed
to flip the class in the title of each image. First, we can observe that l∞-perturbations are sparse
which is due to the fact that we modify only the pixels that influence particular decision stumps that
contribute to minimization of (5). The main observation is that the perturbations for plain models are
imperceptible, while for robust models they are much larger in terms of the l∞-norm. In particular,
they have usually ‖δ‖∞ slightly larger than 0.3 which makes sense since the  that we used during
training was equal to 0.3. Moreover, for robust models, the perturbations are situated at the locations
where one can expect pixels of the opposite classes.
6 Conclusions
We introduce efficient robust optimization methods for boosted decision stumps and boosted decision
trees wrt l∞-perturbations. In particular, we show how to solve the underlying min-max problem for
boosted stumps exactly. Our experimental results confirm efficiency of the proposed methods. For
boosted trees, we provably improve robustness over plain models. As future work it will be interesting
to identify other non-trivial classifiers for which one can perform robust optimization exactly and
efficiently. Alternatively, deriving tight upper bounds on the robust loss is another promising direction
as shown in this work.
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Figure 3: Exact adversarial examples for boosted stumps on MNIST 1-5 and MNIST 2-6. We show the size of
l∞-perturbation needed to flip the class in the title of each image. We can observe that perturbations for plain
models are imperceptible while for robust models they are much larger in l∞-norm and situated at the locations
where one can expect pixels of the opposite classes.
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